Defense: The “Key” to the Industry

After decades of deindustrialization, new factories are opening once again in our country. The revival of Greek industry hinges on the defense sector and can help the country transition from being a consumer to a producer. However, “incentives” are needed.

Defense: The “Key” to the Industry

This article is an AI translation of an original piece published in Greek. Read original

My dear friends, good day to you all!

For decades, Greece spent billions on its defense and reaped very little for its economy. It purchased weapons systems but did not build up its industrial base. It strengthened its deterrent power but not its productive capacity.

Simply put, we were buying defense and “exporting” growth. The military equipment remained in Greece, but the jobs, the know-how, and the production ended up abroad.

Today, perhaps for the first time in many decades, this equation may change.

The Long-Term Defense Equipment Plan for the period 2025–2036, amounting to approximately 30 billion euros, is not merely another defense procurement program. Under the right conditions, it could become the largest industrial program the country has seen since the restoration of democracy. And this comes at a time when Europe has decided to invest a total of 800 billion euros through ReArm Europe, seeking to strengthen its strategic and defense autonomy.

The question, however, is not whether the money will be spent. The question is where it will end up. Because Greece stands at a crossroads. If it repeats the model of the past—that of an “customer” for military equipment—it will miss the opportunity once again. But if it seizes this moment to build a manufacturing base, then defense spending can become a catalyst for industrial renewal.

This is an opportunity that is unlikely to be repeated. It is rare for such large-scale national defense procurement programs to coincide with a pan-European effort to rebuild the defense industry. The timing is not merely favorable. It is historic.

Because defense is not just about frigates, missiles, and drones. It involves metals, electronics, software, sensors, composite materials, shipyards, mechanical engineering, university research, and innovation. It involves thousands of highly skilled jobs and dozens of manufacturing sectors that can benefit from the creation of new production capacity.

Europe is rediscovering something it had forgotten for years: without production, there is no strategic autonomy. And without industry, there is neither economic nor geopolitical power. Security is returning to the core of economic policy, and with it, the importance of production is returning.

Greece now has tangible examples to point to. Yesterday, yet another METLEN production facility was inaugurated in Volos, in a region that for years had seen factories closing rather than opening.

The shipyards of Elefsina, Syros, Skaramanga, and Salamis are vying for a place in the new European value chains. Greek companies are already participating in European programs for frigates, electronic systems, optical applications, and defense technology.

Most importantly, however, a different mindset is beginning to take shape. The notion that a portion of defense spending must be reinvested in the Greek economy in the form of production, know-how, and employment.

The provision for a minimum Greek participation of 25% in defense programs moves in this direction. Evangelos Mytilineos’s proposal to award additional points to bids that exceed this percentage points to a path that deserves serious consideration.

For whether Greece will gain a substantial share in production or, once again, be limited to the role of a customer depends in part on the incentive factor. The goal is not to create more subcontractors but more producers.

The country has paid dearly for its production deficit. For decades, it relied primarily on consumption, services, and borrowing. Industry has shrunk, shipyards have fallen into disuse, and manufacturing has declined. Today, there is a historic opportunity to reverse this trend.

Defense can become much more than just a security policy. It can become a policy for development. It can link production with technology, innovation with employment, and national power with economic resilience.

Greece does not just need more military equipment. It needs more factories. For decades, it has been buying security without generating growth. Now it has the opportunity to achieve both.

The question is whether it will seize this opportunity or add yet another failed industrial venture to Greece’s long list of missed opportunities.

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