A few months ago, Michalis Salas—a man whom one would hardly classify as an anti-establishment critic of the markets—offered a pithy aphorism about the crisis in the Western political system.
He wrote that neoliberalism “has turned politicians into servants of the markets, forced to carry out decisions without making them.”
But at a time when markets, debt, geopolitics, and soaring inflation are narrowing the scope for political action, something else is happening as well. Politicians themselves are becoming expendable. They are punished not only for what they do, but also for what citizens perceive they can no longer do.
There were essentially two paths that led to the current situation: asymmetric globalization and the excessive indebtedness of nations—especially in Europe—combined with monetary union.
The result was that most nations lost their ability to exercise meaningful autonomy in economic policy, in the taxation of wealth—and, in the case of Europe, the tools of autonomous monetary policy.
Excessive debt—a consequence, to some extent, of the mindset of politicians who view their four-year term in office as their sole horizon—is the other side of the coin.
It often served as a substitute for insufficient government revenue, with the aim of creating an illusion of prosperity for voters—one that was no longer based on actual productive capacity.
At the same time, the much-touted “international competitive advantages” of globalization were creating, unevenly, year after year, winners and losers. The winners were very often outside the West, and the losers within the West.
Of course, the economy is not the only factor. The crisis of political trust is also fueled by immigration, social media, and a sense of cultural insecurity. The common thread among all these factors, however, is that governments appear increasingly incapable of controlling developments.
A smaller slice of the pie, rising inequality
In the U.S., the leading force behind globalization, the result has been a fundamental contrast. On the one hand, a thriving private sector; on the other, a heavily indebted government with massive deficits.
In Europe, the gradual accumulation of excessive debt in many countries was accompanied by comparatively low growth rates, due to a series of constraints, such as the addition of new layers of bureaucracy by European authorities and procedures, the relatively low penetration of innovation, the overemphasis on “green policies,” and, in many countries, the side effects of the single currency.
We are currently reaping the consequences of past choices. China has emerged as an industrial superpower, while other major countries of the Global South, with much younger populations, are claiming an increasing share of the “pie.”
For big capital in the West, this relentless competition has created a new reality. Coupled with its financialization, it has given the ever-present desire for higher profits the added incentive of necessity.
Relatively large Western companies have become disconnected from the markets in their home countries, expanding into third countries; this is why we are seeing the so-called “decoupling” between stock markets and local economies intensify.
The same phenomenon, however, is also evident in societies. Corporate profits are rising faster than wages, which cannot keep pace with rising costs, particularly for basic necessities such as housing, healthcare, and living expenses.
The result is a widening of existing inequalities and, in the process, the accumulation of social and, ultimately, political tensions.
When the markets vote before the citizens
In today’s world, even the all-powerful U.S. president lives under the “threat” of the bond market. We saw this in 2025 with the tariff issue. We saw it again in 2026 with the war in the Persian Gulf.
How much more so for the leaders of European nations. A prime example is Britain, which, faced with the dead ends it is encountering, is heading toward its seventh prime minister in a decade of political instability. But it is not alone.
According to a pan-European YouGov survey published on June 8, Chancellor Merz’s approval rating in Germany stands at 16%, even though he has been in office for just over a year! The popularity of French President Macron, who has gone through seven prime ministers in nine years, now stands at 18%. Both have lower approval ratings than the 21% enjoyed by Keir Starmer, who has already been forced to resign.
An analysis of election results over the past four years paints the same picture. With very few exceptions—especially since 2022—being elected prime minister in a European country virtually guarantees the defeat of that leader and their party in the next election.
There have, of course, been exceptions. Among them are Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Greece and Pedro Sánchez in Spain.
Analysts say the latter’s success is due, mainly to the cheap energy he secured for his country and to the immigration of Spanish-speaking people from Latin America, which unleashed productive forces without creating tensions, thanks to a shared culture and tradition.
In the case of the Mitsotakis administrations, it is difficult to separate the success in the 2023 elections from the economic rebound following years of crisis and the Covid period.
In short, these are exceptions that seem to confirm the rule, as the tight constraints of globalized markets and “prevailing” economic policy severely limit room for maneuver during a period of intense pressure on citizens’ purchasing power.
“Disposable” Political Leaders
Thus, politicians of the established system, who “serve up” roughly the same solutions, become part of the “menu.”
They become “disposable” leaders, as a large portion of the public grows dissatisfied, longing for the past, and consequently turns increasingly to other, gradually more unconventional solutions, seeking a way out of their problems and unmet expectations.
Greece is not immune to this trend. It simply manifests it with its own delay and its own peculiarities.
It is this trend that largely explains New Democracy’s current poll numbers (voting intention in the 25% range), PASOK’s inability to become the main opposition force, as well as the almost automatic rise in the polls of ELAS to the position of the official opposition.
However, as the rise of the once “anti-establishment” Giorgia Meloni in Italy has shown, whoever is elected will likely be forced to play by the rules of the dominant system, risking becoming part of the establishment themselves.
It is telling that Meloni, who remains among the most popular politicians in Europe with a popularity rating of 38%, according to YouGov, is pushing for a change in the electoral system ahead of the 2027 elections in order to strengthen her position and ensure “governmental stability.”
The Imbalance Between Democracy and Capitalism
The problem, therefore, runs deeper. It goes beyond the personalities and capabilities of political leaders, because the balance between liberal democracy and capitalism—which seemed to function harmoniously in earlier decades—has now been upset, to the benefit of the latter.
This is not expected to change easily, partly due to the relentless competition between Western capitalism and its “hybrids” in the major developing economies, with China at the forefront.
The question, then, is not merely who will win the next elections and where. It is how much longer the political systems of Western countries can withstand a period in which citizens are voting for change, but governments have ever less room to deliver it.
And, ultimately, how much can the political system itself—in the form we have come to know it—withstand this pressure?