The problem with the “right side” of history, as the government has recently discovered, is that it is determined in hindsight, usually by the victors of major geopolitical realignments.
Until then, it depends on unpredictable shifts in the balance of power, such as those that now make Turkey strategically useful to the U.S., NATO, and many European capitals.
If the conflict between the U.S. and Israel on one side and Iran on the other had resulted in a clear victory for the former, things might have been quite different. Instead, according to many analysts, Iran is emerging geostrategically strengthened, the very close U.S.-Israel relationship appears to be under strain, and Turkey is gaining prominence.
Not only in relation to the threat from Russia, as perceived by much of Europe—a development that has been underway for some time—but also as a key player in the new geopolitical dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
It is within this geopolitical context that the NATO Summit will take place in Ankara tomorrow and the day after (July 7–8). Officially, it will focus on reaffirming collective defense, supporting Ukraine, increasing defense spending, and shifting a greater burden onto European allies.
At the same time, however, a number of European countries—from the UK with its Eurofighters to Germany, Italy, the Baltic states, and Spain—clearly desire closer defense cooperation with our neighbor, showing utter indifference to the hypocrisy revealed by this stance, given what is happening under the Erdoğan regime—both toward Greece and Cyprus, as well as within the country itself.
At this juncture, Greek objections—regarding issues of sovereignty, Cyprus, and “casus belli”—unfortunately risk being treated as an “annoying” detail that “hinders” NATO and European defense.
Erdoğan’s Big Opportunity
In short, Turkey is not merely hosting yet another NATO summit. For Turkey, this is perhaps the best opportunity in recent years to reposition itself at the very heart of Western defense—largely on its own terms.
Donald Trump is also set to attend the summit—the first U.S. president to visit Turkey since Barack Obama in 2015—while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already announced that he will most likely hold a bilateral meeting with him.
This is the real political “window of opportunity” for Ankara, because many of Turkey’s objectives will not be formally decided by NATO, but are instead shaped by Washington, Europe, and the Alliance’s internal dynamics.
Turkey’s first and most realistic goal is to fully restore its image as an “indispensable ally.” Ankara wants to be seen not as the Alliance’s “bad boy,” but as the country with the second-largest military power in NATO, a strong defense industry, and a critical role in the Black Sea, the Straits, the Middle East, and the Caucasus.
And it is very likely that it will achieve this—politically, symbolically, and operationally.
Its second goal is greater participation in European defense initiatives and new supply chains, using NATO as a lever. Ankara will push hard, but success will likely be only partial.
NATO can send a political message in favor of “including” non-European allies. However, it cannot, on its own, open up EU funds and mechanisms, where there is resistance, primarily from Greece and Cyprus.
That is precisely why Turkey is independently pursuing its bilateral defense relations with Europe, bypassing the “sticking point” of Greek participation in EU institutions.
The Two New “Strategies” and Their Objectives
A third objective—but a very important one, and a dangerous one for our country’s geopolitical position—is to strengthen Turkey’s role in NATO’s new command architecture, primarily in the Black Sea and on the “southern front,” that is, in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
This involves two critical objectives, linked by a common logic: the establishment of geographical position as a strategic advantage. In Istanbul, Ankara has already established a naval command intended to lead the naval component of future security guarantees for Ukraine in the Black Sea and the straits leading to the Mediterranean.
In Adana, the plan for a multinational force or headquarters under Turkish command—designed to address crises on the southern front—is moving from the proposal phase to the preparation phase. The 6th Army Corps has already been designated as its core, with a target completion date of 2028.
The question at this summit is how far the allies are willing to go in institutionally enshrining Turkey’s primacy on these two fronts.
For Greece, this development is critical, as it is gradually shifting Turkey from the position of a “problematic ally” to that of an operational hub, particularly in regions where Athens has a direct interest—and, moreover, with the advantage of “sudden affection” from states on NATO’s European flank.
The Turkey-U.S.-Israel and Greece-Israel-Cyprus triangles
Behind the Alliance’s official proceedings lies another level of dynamics—one that will not be reflected in any official communiqué—with Israel at its center.
Relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have entered a phase of deep tension, centered on Syria, but also on Gaza, the Eastern Mediterranean—where Turkey is troubled by the deepening of allied ties between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel—as well as the overall security architecture in the Middle East.
For Turkey, deeper integration into NATO now also serves as an indirect institutional safeguard against the possibility of an uncontrolled confrontation with Israel. Not, of course, in the sense that the Alliance would automatically become involved in a Turkish-Israeli crisis.
However, the more deeply Turkey is integrated into NATO’s command structures, missions, and defense architecture, the more difficult it is for a non-member country to treat it as a second-tier regional player.
This is where Donald Trump’s role comes into play. The American president can be both the channel Erdoğan needs to Washington and the brake that will prevent an uncontrolled Turkish-Israeli escalation —because he is not likely to easily clash with Israel for Ankara’s sake.
The F-35s, the KAAN, and… History
Turkey’s main goal—namely, returning to the F-35 program and lifting the CAATSA sanctions over the S-400s—is likely also the most difficult.
In terms of individual defense agreements, however, the path has already been paved. Just last week, the State Department notified Congress that it is moving forward—ignoring the objections of influential members of Congress—with the sale of engines worth over $700 million for the Turkish KAAN fighter jet.
As for the F-35s, Trump is publicly promising to do “something that will make Erdogan very happy.” However, even if a resounding announcement is made in Ankara, a political signal is one thing, and actual reintegration is another.
This remains a low-probability scenario as long as the S-400 issue remains unresolved—due to the legal framework and reactions in Congress, where the Greek and Jewish lobbies are active.
More broadly, however, developments are unlikely to be favorable for Athens. Greece may believe it is on the “right side” of history. But history, especially during major geopolitical realignments, does not simply reward consistency. It rewards—very coldly, often, and above all—utility.
This is precisely what Turkey is now attempting to capitalize on.