Dear friends, good day to you!
Anyone who wants to assess what Marco Rubio may be bringing in his luggage to Athens would do well to look first toward Ankara. Greece has been upgraded significantly in American planning. Turkey, however, has not been downgraded.
This is perhaps the most useful starting point for the visit of the American Secretary of State and the 6th Greece–U.S. Strategic Dialogue.
Washington knows very well what it wants from Greece. Souda and Alexandroupoli, a reliable ally on NATO’s southeastern flank and, increasingly, an energy gateway to Central and Eastern Europe. And certainly the continuation of defense procurements as well.
Rubio himself said it almost without beating around the bush, when he rushed to defend Kimberly Guilfoyle: he praised her work in promoting American energy interests in Greece and Southeastern Europe, specifically naming the Vertical Energy Corridor.
That is no small matter. American LNG, Alexandroupoli, and the Greek network can serve as a gateway to Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine, reducing their dependence on Russian gas. Chevron and ExxonMobil are also strengthening their presence in Greek hydrocarbon exploration.
Greece, too, has invested a great deal in the strategic relationship. Beyond the facilities provided to American forces, it is buying F-35s, Black Hawks, and other American weapons systems, while continuing an armaments program worth tens of billions, a significant part of which has already been directed toward France and Israel.
So far there is no indication that Rubio is coming with any major new arms package in his luggage. Defense cooperation, however, is officially included on his agenda. Things become more difficult, however, when we move from shared interests to Greek-Turkish issues.
The Trump administration is also seeking at the same time to restore defense relations with Ankara. It has moved forward with the sale of American engines for the Turkish KAAN fighter jet and has left open the possibility of Turkey’s return to the F-35 program, provided the problem of the Russian S-400s is overcome.
For Washington, moreover, Greece and Turkey remain two allies of NATO whose differences must be resolved through dialogue and without tensions. That was its line in the previous Strategic Dialogue, and there are no indications that it has changed.
The GSI could be a useful—even necessary—test. The U.S. supports energy interconnections in the Eastern Mediterranean. But supporting a cable is one thing, and supporting Greece when its construction runs up against Turkish claims is another.
The same applies to the Aegean, the 12 miles, and maritime zones.
This is also where the limit of expectations from Rubio’s visit lies. The convergence of Greek and American interests is great when we are talking about LNG, energy corridors, Souda, Alexandroupoli, armaments, and regional stability. It becomes much less self-evident when support for Greek positions entails a cost to Washington’s relations with Ankara.
Today Greece is more useful to the United States than it has been in decades. This is significant diplomatic capital and must be utilized. It does not, however, constitute an American guarantee against Turkey. Rubio is coming to Athens because the two countries have many common interests. On Greek-Turkish issues, however, Washington continues to have interests on both sides of the Aegean.
That is why our basket must remain small.