Dear friends, good morning!
Six years to end up more or less where we started.
In August 2020, Greece signed an agreement with Egypt on the partial delimitation of their EEZ. It was Greece’s most significant response to the 2019 Turkish-Libyan memorandum and, at the same time, a good first step. Not the last.
The agreement itself provided for continued negotiations, and Kyriakos Mitsotakis told parliament at the time that the two sides were explicitly committed to continuing. He also stressed that Egypt had moved away from its initial position of limiting the agreement to the area between the 26th and 28th meridians, and had agreed to continue negotiations with a broader scope.
In 2021, it became clear just how important this was. An Egyptian energy block east of the 28th meridian appeared with a boundary that coincided with Turkey’s interpretation of the continental shelf. The foreign minister at the time, Nikos Dendias, travelled to Cairo. The Egyptian side adjusted the map so that the block did not extend beyond the 28th meridian, and the problem was addressed.
But not its cause: the delimitation remained incomplete.
And it was still incomplete in 2025. In July that year, Egypt delivered a note verbale concerning Greece’s maritime spatial planning. The Greek Foreign Ministry itself explained that it was an “expected reaction” by a neighbouring state “with which the delimitation of maritime zones remains pending”. So the outstanding issue was well known. And yet.
On 6 August 2025, exactly five years after the agreement was signed, Giorgos Gerapetritis welcomed his Egyptian counterpart Badr Abdelatty to Athens.
Giorgos Gerapetritis described the 2020 agreement as “exemplary”, acknowledged that Greece had only reached a partial delimitation with Egypt and spoke of the “remaining delimitations”.
But what negotiations did he announce would begin? Not talks to complete the delimitation with Egypt. Technical talks with Libya.
And this was no passing remark. In early September, the Foreign Ministry itself said that “for the time being, nothing was in sight” in discussions on delimitation with Egypt.
The choice became a political priority. Last June, after the second round of technical talks between Athens and Tripoli, the Greek Foreign Ministry announced that “Greece’s priority of Greece remains the delimitation of an Exclusive Economic Zone with Libya.”
Four months later, the House of Representatives in eastern Libya approved the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, which it had rejected for years.
And now we are back in Cairo.
Just the day before yesterday, Mr Gerapetritis said that an extension of the agreement with Egypt would be discussed “in due course”. Yesterday, after his latest conversation with Mr Abdelatty, the two ministers agreed to continue consultations with a view to extending the geographical scope of the 2020 agreement.
Better late than... never.
Of course, full delimitation with Egypt was never, and is still not, an easy matter. Cairo has its own interests and reservations, and no one can know whether a comprehensive agreement was possible over all these years.
But the question remains.
Since we knew the 2020 delimitation was partial, since we had seen in practice from 2021 the problems created by the outstanding issue, and since in 2025 Egypt itself reminded us that the matter remained open, why was delimitation with Libya Greece’s diplomatic priority?
In 2020, we turned to Egypt in response to the Turkish-Libyan memorandum. In 2025, we turned to Libya, and by 2026 we had declared it a priority. In 2026, Libya ratified the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, and we are turning back to Egypt.
Six years later, we are still chasing our own tail.