Good morning, friends!
Antonis Samaras yesterday called in Estia for the removal of George Gerapetritis, launching a broadside against the government’s foreign policy. He described developments in Libya as “the definition of failure” and argued that the handling of the Greece–Cyprus cable project was leading to an erosion of sovereign rights.
Strong words. And certainly open to debate. But just a few hours later, another former New Democracy prime minister, Costas Karamanlis, weighed in.
Speaking at the War Museum, Mr Karamanlis argued that when Turkey opposes the Kasos–Cyprus electricity interconnector, “it means that even on matters that should be self-evident in the region, it believes it must have the final say”. He was even more explicit on the issue at hand: any request for permission from Turkey for the cable would be unacceptable, “whether it is called notification, an announcement or whatever else”.
So two former New Democracy prime ministers are raising the same issue, albeit in different ways and with different degrees of force.
There is, however, a specific question that does not require anyone to share their criticism to be worth asking. It arises from the foreign minister’s own statements.
On 1 September, George Gerapetritis was asked whether Turkey would be informed about the Great Sea Interconnector surveys.
His answer was clear: “The NAVTEX notices that are issued are precisely a means of informing all passing vessels and adjacent states for the safety of navigation.” He added that “permission will not be sought from either Greece or France”.
He returned to the issue on 29 September. Turkey, he said, “can be informed” under the applicable rules, and “the NAVTEX is issued precisely to inform all adjacent states and seafarers”. He concluded: “So there are ways to communicate. Permission, however, will be granted only by Greece.”
So far, so clear. But then Hakan Fidan entered the picture.
The Turkish foreign minister made clear that Ankara wants written notification, specifying the work to be carried out and the coordinates. He linked this demand to two particularly interesting concepts: avoiding any disruption to the “status quo” and preventing the creation of a “precedent”.
On 21 October, Mr Gerapetritis was asked directly about this demand. Greece, he replied, is the only country from which permission will be sought. He added, however, that after Greece had granted authorisation, “notification regarding the survey and cable-laying is something that could be possible”, clarifying that this would not be an authorisation process.
This is where things get difficult.
No one is asking any longer whether Greece will seek permission from Turkey. Nor is that the question the government needs to answer. If, according to the foreign minister himself, the NAVTEX informs adjacent states, why is a second, specific notification to Turkey needed?
Pavlos Marinakis reiterated yesterday that “there is no question of seeking permission from Turkey” and clarified that authorisation is one thing, while notifications provided for under the international framework for carrying out the work are another.
Agreed. But that sends the discussion round in circles and back to square one. What notification, exactly, is required in addition to the NAVTEX? What would it add to what will already be communicated through it? Who would send it? Athens? Paris? And, above all, with what wording?
This is not a difference of wording. It is substantive. If Greece authorises the surveys, issues the NAVTEX and the vessel proceeds regardless of Turkey’s response, then the country is exercising in practice the jurisdiction it says it has.
But if, in order to preserve “calm waters”, Athens agrees to a process of specific notification, despite having until now pointed to the NAVTEX as the prescribed means of notification, it should say so. And, above all, it should explain exactly what it is agreeing to.
Fidan did not speak of a “precedent” by chance.
Avoiding a Greek-Turkish crisis is an entirely legitimate goal. Back-channel diplomatic understandings are also legitimate and often necessary. But back-channel talks do not absolve the government of its obligation to explain the outcome.
What happens if Turkey receives the “note” and responds that it does not consent? Will the vessel proceed?
Because if it does, then we are indeed talking about notification. If not, we are talking about something entirely different.