The cable and the triumph of backroom diplomacy

Nikos Christodoulides put it plainly: as regards the GSI, “whatever needs to be done [...] is being done”, but “away from the spotlight”. Backroom diplomacy is legitimate. But when sovereign rights are at stake, its outcome must be judged in the open.

The cable and the triumph of backroom diplomacy

This article is an AI translation of an original piece published in Greek. Read original

Dear friends, good morning!

So, it seems, backroom dealings do exist. And this is not being said by so-called “imaginative” journalists, or by those who see secret deals with Turkey everywhere.

It is being said by the President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Asked yesterday whether there had been any developments regarding the issuance of the Greek NAVTEX for the Great Sea Interconnector, and whether it was a matter of hours, Nikos Christodoulides was clear:

“Whatever needs to be done on this specific issue is being done by the Republic of Cyprus in relation to the exercise of its sovereign rights, away from the spotlight and without making numerous statements.”

There is, of course, nothing wrong with that so far. Diplomacy is not conducted in front of television cameras, and no serious person would expect talks and negotiations between states to be made public in real time.

But what exactly is happening “away from the spotlight” and, above all, what will be the outcome of these “backroom dealings”?

Because the Abeille Marengo is already in Heraklion, waiting for the Greek NAVTEX before beginning its cable surveys. Athens has repeatedly said that Greece alone will issue the permit for the work.

George Gerapetritis put it in the clearest possible terms: “Only Greece will issue the permit.” But he added something else, too: that Turkey could be informed, without ruling out a “special” briefing, and that, in any case, the purpose of a NAVTEX is precisely to inform neighbouring states and mariners.

But this is where the cables get tangled.

What is happening these days south-east of Crete is particularly interesting. The research vessel KOBI RUEGG is conducting surveys for the installation of a fibre-optic cable under a Greek permit. Turkey has issued its own NAVTEX and claims that the vessel is carrying out its surveys with the “consent of the Republic of Turkey”.

Greece responded by declaring the Turkish NAVTEX invalid and without legal effect (null and void), reiterating that the surveys are being conducted under a Greek permit in areas of the Greek continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, and issuing its own notice.

And the vessel? It is carrying on as normal.

So we have a highly interesting precedent: Athens and Ankara are publicly maintaining their positions, issuing conflicting NAVTEX notices; Turkey appears to have given its “consent”, while Greece rejects Turkey’s authority — yet the surveys are going ahead.

We do not know whether this model has any bearing on what is being prepared for the GSI. And precisely because we do not know, we need to find out.

A few days ago, the foreign minister was categorical: “There is no communication with Turkey regarding the laying of the electric cable.” Now, the President of the Republic of Cyprus is telling us that action is being taken “away from the spotlight”.

The two statements are not necessarily contradictory. The behind-the-scenes activity may involve Nicosia, Athens, Paris, Brussels or any combination of them. It may concern operational arrangements and have nothing to do with Ankara.

We are not entitled to fill in the gaps with assumptions. But we are entitled to ask what the final outcome will be.

Because the real issue is not whether behind-the-scenes discussions are taking place. In foreign policy, they always have, do and will. The issue is what they produce.

If the Abeille Marengo leaves Heraklion and resumes its surveys from where they stopped, without Greece having sought or accepted any Turkish permit or “consent”, we will have a specific outcome that can be assessed.

If, on the other hand, the resumption of surveys requires some formula that allows Turkey to appear to have jurisdiction or a right to give consent in areas where Greece considers itself to exercise maritime jurisdiction, that would be an entirely different outcome.

And that is what we need to know. Not the minutes of meetings. Not who called whom. Nor what was said behind closed doors. The outcome.

Backroom diplomacy can be useful, and sometimes essential, in conducting foreign policy. But when sovereign rights are at stake, its “triumph” is not judged by whether a formula has been found to allow the project to proceed. It is judged by what that formula produces: whether it safeguards Greece’s position or creates a precedent that Turkey could invoke in the future.

Ultimately, this must come to light.

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