Months ago, Michalis Sallas, a man whom one would hardly classify among the anti-establishment critics of the markets, formulated an apt aphorism about the crisis in the political system of the West.
He wrote that neoliberalism “turned politicians into waiters of the markets, obliged to carry decisions without making them”.
In a period, however, when the markets, debts, geopolitics and explosive high prices are narrowing the margins of policy, something else is now also happening. Politicians themselves are becoming disposable. They are punished not only for what they do, but also for what citizens perceive they can no longer do.
The paths that led us to the current situation were mainly two. Asymmetrical globalization and the over-indebtedness of states, especially in Europe in combination with monetary union.
The result was that most states lost the ability for substantial autonomy in economic policy, in the taxation of wealth- and in Europe’s case, the tools of autonomous monetary policy.
Over-indebtedness, a byproduct to some extent of politicians’ mentality of seeing the four-year term of their power as their horizon, constitutes the other side of the coin.
It often functioned as a substitute for insufficient state revenues, with the aim of creating among voters an image of artificial prosperity, which was no longer based on real productive capacities.
During the same period, the famous “international competitive advantages” of globalization were creating, unevenly, year by year, winners and losers. Winners, very often, outside the West and losers within the West.
Of course, the economy is not the only factor. The crisis of political trust is also fueled by migration, social networks and the sense of cultural insecurity. The common denominator of all of them, however, is that governments appear less and less capable of controlling developments.
Smaller share of the pie, increase in inequalities
In the US, the leading power of globalization, the result was a fundamental contrast. On the one hand, a thriving private economy, and on the other, an over-borrowed state with huge deficits.
In Europe, the gradual over-indebtedness of many countries was accompanied by comparatively low growth rates, due to a series of rigidities, such as the addition of new levels of bureaucracy by European authorities and procedures, the proportionally low penetration of innovation, the excess in “green policies” and, in many countries, the side effects of the common currency.
At this time we are living through the consequences of previous choices. China has evolved into an industrial super-champion, while other major countries of the Global South, with much younger populations, are claiming an increasing share of the “pie.”
For big capital in the West, this relentless competition has created new conditions. Together with its financialization, it has given the ever-present desire for higher profits the additional motive of necessity.
The relatively large businesses of the West have become disconnected from the markets at their headquarters, expanding into third countries, which is why we see the so-called “decoupling” between stock markets and local economies intensifying.
The same phenomenon, however, also appears in societies. Business profits are strengthening faster than wages, which cannot keep up with rising prices, especially in basic goods such as housing, health and living costs.
The result is the widening of already existing inequalities and, in the process, the accumulation of social and, ultimately, political tensions.
When markets vote before citizens
In today’s era, even the all-powerful president of the US lives with the “threat” of the bond market. We saw it in 2025 with the tariff affair. We also saw it in 2026 with the war in the Persian Gulf.
All the more so the leaders of European states. A characteristic example is Britain, which, faced with the dead ends it is confronting, is heading toward its seventh prime minister within a decade of political instability. But it is not alone.
According to a pan-European YouGov survey published on June 8, Chancellor Merz’s popularity in Germany stands at 16%, even though he has governed for just over one year! The popularity of French President Macron, who has changed seven prime ministers in nine years, now stands at 18%. Both show lower popularity than the 21% of Keir Starmer, who was already forced to resign
The same picture is also given by the study of election results over the last four years. With very few exceptions, especially from 2022 onward, being declared prime minister in a European state almost preordains the defeat of both himself and his faction in the next elections.
There were, of course, exceptions. Among them Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Greece and Pedro Sánchez in Spain.
The success of the latter is due, analysts say, mainly to the cheap energy his country secured and to the migration of Spanish-speakers from Latin America, which unleashed productive forces without creating tensions, due to common culture and tradition.
In the case of the Mitsotakis governments, it is difficult for someone to disconnect the success in the 2023 elections from the decompression of the spring in the economy, after years of crisis and the Covid period.
In short, these are exceptions that rather confirm the rule, as the tight corsets of globalized markets and the “prevailing” economic policy suffocatingly limit the margins, in a period of intense pressure on the citizen’s purchasing power.
“Single-use” political leaders
Thus, the politicians of the establishment system, who “serve” roughly the same solutions, become part of the “menu.”
They become “single-use” leaders, as a large part of citizens feel discontent, longing for the past, with the result that they turn more and more to other, gradually more unconventional solutions, seeking a way out for their problems and expectations.
Greece is not outside this trend. It simply expresses it with its own delay and its own peculiarities.
It is this trend that largely explains the current percentages of New Democracy (voting intention in the region of 25%), the inability of PASOK to become the main opposition pole, as well as the almost automatic polling rise of ELAS to the position of official opposition.
As the course of the once “anti-establishment” Giorgia Meloni in Italy also showed, whoever is elected will probably be forced to play by the terms of the dominant system, risking becoming, too, part of the menu.
It is characteristic that even Meloni, who remains among the most popular politicians in Europe, with popularity in the range of 38%, according to YouGov, is moving toward changing the electoral system ahead of the 2027 elections, in order to strengthen her position and “governmental stability.”
The imbalance between Democracy and Capitalism
The problem, therefore, is deeper. It goes beyond the profiles and capabilities of political leaders, because the balance between liberal democracy and capitalism, which seemed to function harmoniously in earlier decades, has now been overturned, in favor of the latter.
Something that is not expected to change easily, also because of the relentless competition between Western capitalism and its “hybrids” in the major developing economies, with China foremost among them.
The question, therefore, is not only who will win the next elections and where. It is how much longer the political systems of Western countries can endure a period during which citizens vote for change, but governments have less and less room to provide it.
And, ultimately, how much the regime itself can withstand this pressure, in the form in which we came to know it.