The bad thing about the “right side” of history, as the government has also been discovering lately, is that it is determined in hindsight, usually by the winners of major geopolitical realignments.
Until then, it depends on unpredictable shifts in the balance of power, such as those that are now making Turkey strategically useful to the US, NATO and many European capitals.
If the conflict of the US and Israel with Iran had ended in a clear victory for the former, things might have been quite different. Instead, Iran emerges, according to many analysts, geostrategically strengthened, the very close US-Israel relationship appears to be under strain and Turkey is being upgraded.
Not only in relation to the threat of Russia, as much of Europe sees it, something that has been happening for some time, but also as an important player in the new balances in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Within this geopolitical framework, the NATO Summit will be held in Ankara tomorrow and the day after tomorrow (7-8 July). Officially, it will focus on reaffirming collective defense, supporting Ukraine, increasing defense spending and shifting a greater burden to the European allies.
At the same time, however, a number of European states -from Britain of the Eurofighters to Germany, Italy, the Baltic countries and Spain- clearly want closer defense cooperation with our neighbor, coldly disregarding the hypocrisy revealed by this stance, given what is happening with the Erdoğan regime, both toward Greece and Cyprus and within the country itself.
In this context, Greek objections, the issues of sovereignty, Cyprus and “casus belli”, unfortunately risk being treated as an “annoying” detail that “hinders” NATO and European defense.
Erdoğan’s great opportunity
In short, Turkey is not merely hosting yet another NATO Summit. For it, this is perhaps the best opportunity of recent years to reposition itself in the hard core of Western defense, to a large extent on its own terms.
Donald Trump is also expected to participate in the Summit -the first American president to visit Turkey since Barack Obama in 2015- while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced that he will in all likelihood have a bilateral meeting with him.
This is the real political “window” for Ankara, because many of the things Turkey wants will not be formally decided by NATO, but they do pass through Washington, Europe and the internal balances of the Alliance.
Turkey’s first and most realistic goal is the full restoration of its image as an “indispensable ally.” Ankara wants to appear not as the Alliance’s “bad boy,” but as the country with the second-largest military power in NATO, a strong defense industry, and a critical role in the Black Sea, the Straits, the Middle East and the Caucasus.
And it is very likely that it will achieve this, politically, symbolically and operationally.
Its second goal is greater participation in European defense initiatives and in the new supply chains, using NATO as leverage. Ankara will press hard, however success will probably be partial.
NATO can send a political message in favor of the “inclusion” of non-European allies. But it cannot by itself open the EU’s funds and mechanisms, where there is resistance, mainly from Greece and Cyprus.
That is why Turkey is independently promoting its bilateral defense relations with Europe, bypassing the “thorn” of Greek participation in EU bodies.
The two new “headquarters” and their goals
A third goal, but a very important one -and dangerous for our country’s geopolitical position- is strengthening Turkey’s role in NATO’s new command architecture, mainly in the Black Sea and on the “southern front,” that is, in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Two critical pursuits fit here, with a common logic: the institutionalization of geographical position as a strategic advantage. In Istanbul, Ankara has already established a naval command intended to lead the naval dimension of future security guarantees for Ukraine in the Black Sea and the straits toward the Mediterranean.
In Adana, the plan for a multinational corps or headquarters under Turkish command, to deal with crises from the southern front, is moving from the proposal phase to the preparation phase. The 6th Army Corps has already been designated as its core, with a completion horizon of 2028.
The question of the Summit is how far the allies are willing to go in institutionally securing Turkish primacy on these two fronts.
For Greece, this development is critical, because it gradually shifts Turkey from the position of “problematic ally” to that of an operational hub, especially in areas where Athens has a direct interest -and indeed with the advantage of the “sudden love” from states of NATO’s European wing.
The Turkey-US-Israel and Greece-Israel-Cyprus triangles
Behind the Alliance’s official processes there is also another level of balances, which will not be reflected in any official communiqué, with Israel as the central point.
The Ankara-Tel Aviv relationship has entered a phase of deep tension, with the central field being Syria, but also Gaza, the Eastern Mediterranean, where our neighbor is annoyed by the deepening allied relations between Greece-Cyprus and Israel, as well as by the overall security architecture in the Middle East.
For Turkey, deeper integration into NATO now also functions as indirect institutional security against the possibility of an uncontrolled confrontation with Israel. Not, of course, in the sense that the Alliance would automatically become involved in a Turkish-Israeli crisis.
However, the more deeply Turkey is integrated into NATO’s command structures, missions and defense architecture, the more difficult it is to treat it as a second-tier regional player by a country that is not a member of it.
Here the role of Donald Trump also emerges. The American president can be both the channel Erdoğan needs to Washington and the brake that will prevent an uncontrolled Turkish-Israeli escalation -because he is not going to clash easily with Israel for Ankara’s sake.
The F-35s, KAAN and… History
Turkey’s major goal, namely returning to the F-35 program and lifting the CAATSA sanctions over the S-400s, is probably also the most difficult.
In the individual defense agreements, however, the road has already opened. Just last week, the State Department informed Congress that it is moving ahead, ignoring the objections of powerful lawmakers, with a sale of engines worth more than 700 million dollars for the Turkish KAAN fighter.
As for the F-35s, Trump is publicly promising that he will do “something that will make Erdoğan very happy.” However, even if a resounding announcement is heard in Ankara, the political signal is one thing, and actual reintegration is another.
This remains a low-probability possibility as long as the S-400 issue is not resolved -because of the legal framework and the reactions in Congress, where the Greek and Jewish lobbies are active.
More broadly, however, developments will probably not be pleasant for Athens. Greece may believe that it is on the “right side” of history. But History, especially in major geopolitical realignments, does not simply reward consistency. It rewards, very coldly, often even more, usefulness.
This is precisely what Turkey is now trying to capitalize on.