Dear friends, good day,
The Greece of recent years is not the Greece of the previous decade.
It has built a strong network of strategic alliances with the US, France, Israel, and the Gulf states. It has upgraded its geopolitical position and has evolved into a critical energy and strategic hub in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Alexandroupoli, the Souda naval base, energy infrastructure, the vertical natural gas corridor, and the presence of American giants such as Chevron in exploration south of Crete, all contribute to a new reality.
At the same time, Greece is rearming at a pace not seen in decades. The Rafale jets, the new frigates, and the imminent arrival of the F-35s substantially bolster the country’s deterrent power, as do, of course, the various other military procurement deals it is pursuing, which also strengthen the growth of its domestic defense industry.
And all this is happening while Turkey is no longer viewed by the West as the “irreplaceable ally” of bygone eras.
However, how exactly is this power being used?
For despite its diplomatic and military strengthening, Athens continues to appear reluctant to exercise its fundamental sovereign rights against Turkey in practice.
The incident in Kasos and the recent harassment of the Italian ship Ocean Link by a Turkish warship, while it was laying a cable between Astypalaia and Kos, were revealing. Ankara does not limit itself to rhetorical outbursts or theoretical claims. It systematically attempts to impose practical restrictions on Greek sovereignty and Greek sovereign rights. This becomes absolutely clear with the alleged imminent submission of the “Blue Homeland” bill on its part.
And Athens, almost permanently by now, chooses to avoid tension, opting to stick to a policy of “calm waters.”
Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis stated just yesterday in Parliament that neither the casus belli nor the Turkey-Libya memorandum produce legal consequences, as they lack a basis in international law. “Nothing is absolutely final. Neither the ‘casus belli’ is final, nor the ‘Turkish-Libyan’ (memorandum),” he stated emphatically
Legally, of course, this position is correct.
Geopolitics, however, does not operate solely on legal arguments. It operates through power. Through presence. Through the exercise of rights.
From 1996, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted on the casus belli regarding the 12-mile zone, to the present day, Greece continues to treat an inalienable sovereign right as a conditional right.
Thirty years later, the extension of territorial waters in the Aegean remains frozen.
Hydrocarbon exploration is limited to the area south of Crete. In the Aegean, with the exception of Prinos, the Greek side avoids any move that could provoke a Turkish reaction.
The “facts on the ground,” however, as described by our dear Mr. Gerapetritis, are not created solely by maps, memoranda, or illegal “laws.” They are created when a country gets into the habit of not exercising its rights because it fears its adversary’s reaction.
They are created when deterrence gradually turns into self-restraint.
Greece today possesses alliances, military capabilities, and international clout that it has not had in decades. But if all this power ends up merely managing Turkish reactions rather than effectively securing Greek rights, then the problem is not a lack of power.
It is the lack of will to secure those rights.