The decision of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court (6/2026) definitively resolves the critical issue regarding the method of calculation and the amount of interest in the home-rescue arrangements under Law 3869/2010 (Katseli Law).
According to the interpretation of the decision, debtors are required to pay the monthly installment corresponding to the portion of the principal repaid each month, plus the interest rate resulting from the Court’s decision.
However, creditor groups (banks/servicers) are reportedly arguing that the decision leaves open the possibility of imposing interest on the principal installment for the entire period from the start of the arrangement until its repayment.
Let us therefore examine whether such an approach could hold up.
The operative part of the decisions in the Katseli Law cases, which the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret, includes two clear requirements for the primary residence rescue arrangement: Fixed monthly principal repayment and interest on the monthly repayment amount.
The first requirement excludes the banking method of amortizing principal, which ensures relative stability in the installment but results in the principal repaid with each installment continuously changing.
The second criterion also excludes the less common banking method of amortization, since while the portion of the principal that is amortized remains constant, the interest is calculated on the remaining principal.
Thus, the first key conclusion reached by the Supreme Court is that “the explicit mention of the amount of the monthly installment in the court decision, in deviation from banking rules, indicates the legislature’s intention to depart from the contractual arrangement of the legal relationship based on the general rules of banking practice.”
As it further points out, in the case of housing protection, the court does not restructure the loan so that the general rules applicable to the calculation of interest on bank claims apply, but rather shapes the repayment terms of the housing protection arrangement itself.
Those who argue against the decision cannot, therefore, invoke arguments based on banking practice. Nor can they ignore the reasons why the Supreme Court distanced itself from it.
The Supreme Court recognizes the importance of protecting the primary residence—as a constitutionally protected social good—for the reintegration of the over-indebted debtor into economic and social life. Thus, regarding the installment set by the Court for the protection of the primary residence, the Supreme Court views it as “a ceiling and not a basis for calculation that could be substantially burdened by the inclusion of exorbitant interest.”
The reason the Supreme Court resorts to calculating the interest rate on the monthly installment is, therefore, to advance the purpose of the law regarding the preservation of the primary residence. It explicitly excludes a banking practice that, through a different calculation, allows the creditor to make a profit, as “this would, in this case, lead to the borrower being trapped once again in exorbitant installments exceeding their financial means, thereby undermining the spirit and purpose of the law. In other words, a different approach would prioritize the satisfaction of creditors at the expense of the debtor’s human dignity, and even their survival—a situation that is not acceptable under the letter and purpose of Law 3869/2010.”
Thus, when the Supreme Court refers to the collection of statutory interest on monetary claims, it means that which “has been recognized by the court decision.” When the court intervenes judicially and divides the principal into several separate principal amounts, stipulating that interest cannot be calculated on the total debt, it shifts the time of debt and interest accrual for the divided principal.
When it subsequently refers to a debt with a fixed or floating interest rate, the distinction is made solely for the purpose of determining the interest rate for the corresponding payment month, based on which the monthly installment will be increased or determined.
What legal circles representing creditors argue would invalidate all of the above reasoning of the Supreme Court. Interest, in their view, constitutes the total debt, as there is no portion of the principal that does not accrue interest and generate profits for the banks/funds.
They portray the Supreme Court as rejecting banking practice, not to lead the debtor—as stated in the decision—to a better situation, but to the same or even a worse one, and in any case a more complex one, since the monthly installment will escalate to ever-higher levels.
The views of the aforementioned circles, which demand interest on the use of capital from the start of the arrangement’s term, were evaluated, rejected by the majority, and constitute the minority opinion in the decision.
The Plenary’s decision, of course, applies retroactively, since the interpretation of decisions dates back to the time of their issuance. Inevitably, in cases where debtors have paid larger amounts, the question arises of either a refund or a setoff of those amounts.
What is paramount—and ultimately benefits creditors above all—is to seek a cooperative resolution with debtors regarding the issues arising from the implementation of the Supreme Court’s decision.
They should provide up-to-date information on the history of debt servicing in order to restore legality, transparency, and stability in the payment of installments. And this collaborative approach is not helped by the distortion of the content of the Plenary Session’s Decision.
* D. Spyrakos holds a Ph.D. in Law. As General Secretary for Consumer Affairs, he was responsible for drafting Law 3869/2010, known as the “Katseli Law.”