After weeks of bombing and subsequent arduous negotiations against the backdrop of an uncertain ceasefire, the Iranian president hailed a “historic” agreement to end the war last Thursday, the day after he and Donald Trump signed the document. “….The fact that they survived the intensity of the Israeli-American raids is in itself a huge victory for the Iranian regime…,” noted a Belgian political scientist who has had a deep understanding of events in Tehran for years.
Although weakened by the elimination of key leaders in its political and military establishments, the Islamic Republic has managed to renew itself internally and impose its terms: an end to the conflict on all fronts, including Lebanon; the lifting of the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz; a commitment by the United States to withdraw its forces from Iran; and the suspension of sanctions on oil sales, along with the unfreezing of Iranian assets. However, the thorny nuclear issue—the main cause of the initial tensions between Tehran and Washington—will remain at the center of future discussions, while the issue of ballistic missiles has been relegated to the background.
Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic continues to demonstrate its strength on the regional front: a few days ago, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, made his first public appearance in months to discuss the agreement, stating on Iranian state television that another narrow strait, Bamb al-Madab, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, was “in the hands of Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and even members of the non-Yemeni resistance.” This was a warning: although weakened, this strategic branch of the regime’s elite army, specializing in asymmetric warfare, continues to wield significant subversive power through its numerous networks and means of exerting pressure in the region. There have, in fact, been recent examples of this.
However, the regime is showing signs of nervousness. The 60-day moratorium announced as part of the “agreement” does not protect Iran from further blows: the possibility of the upcoming talks failing, as well as the possibility of a new attack by Benjamin Netanyahu, who is furious at being excluded from these decisions, is keeping the Iranian government on high alert, with all that this implies for the future of the agreement. Domestically, the authorities are also struggling to hide their wounds: the funeral ceremony for the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed on the first day of the attacks, February 28, has not yet taken place. His son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei, remains out of the public eye. Seriously injured, he is said to have given his approval to the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, according to U.S. officials.
The outline of this “agreement” has also highlighted internal divisions within the Islamic government. In recent days, the pro-regime rallies that began at the start of the war have turned into demonstrations against the agreement reached with the long-standing enemy, the United States. This uprising, led by a radical faction, has resulted in extremely harsh slogans directed at Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the chief negotiators of this agreement. The latter are accused of “…selling the blood of the martyrs…” and “betraying” the country. “…Death to the supporters of compromise…,” “…Galibaf, Aragchi, what did you do with our leader’s blood?...”, and “…Aragchi, shame on you, leave America!...”, shouted the protesters, some of whom were wrapped in shrouds.
It was obvious, however, that these orchestrated protesters represent a fanatical faction of the regime, which, with Donald Trump’s help, will have opportunities to strengthen its presence on the Iranian political scene.
In the absence of a single leader—as has always been the case since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979—decisions in Iran are now made collectively and could lead to friction between two main factions: the ultra-conservatives, committed to the regime’s ideological survival, and the pragmatists, who are interested in prioritizing the regime’s economic survival.
If there is one issue on which the two rival groups still agree, it is the intensified repression, which has taken a toll on the population—the great forgotten element of this “agreement.” Plagued by inflation and rampant unemployment, and still reeling from the massacres of protesters in early January, civil society continues to bear the brunt of the regime’s wrath. Just last Tuesday, two Iranian protesters, Javad Zasnani and Abolfazl Saeedi, were executed on charges of “waging war against God” and “corruption on earth.”
However, the Iranians have not given up: ten days ago, despite the risks involved, students took to the streets again in Tehran, Shiraz, and Isfahan to protest their working conditions and exams. Proof that the regime is not as stable as it seems.
And those who rushed to overthrow it ultimately achieved exactly the opposite.