The EU's Push for Unified Oversight to Combat Economic Crime

The new oversight mechanism is launching its operations in Frankfurt. Expectations are high for the fight against money laundering. By Spyros Papathanassiou and Maria Kaini.

The EU's Push for Unified Oversight to Combat Economic Crime

This article is an AI translation of an original piece published in Greek. Read original

On June 9, 2025, in Frankfurt, the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) held its first official conference.

This date may prove to be a historic one for European financial supervision. For the first time, the European Union is attempting to create a truly unified coordination mechanism to combat money laundering. The question is whether the new Authority can succeed where, for decades, national supervisory authorities have struggled to cooperate effectively.

The European Union is entering a new phase in the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). At the heart of this transition is the AMLA (Anti-Money Laundering Authority), the new European authority that aims to reduce discrepancies among national supervisory regimes and strengthen the coherence of the EU framework.

This development is not merely of administrative or organizational significance. It concerns the very way in which Europe conceives of financial integrity, transparency, and cross-border supervision within the single market.

For a long time, the Union relied on a regulatory system in which the basic principles were shared, but their implementation remained significantly divergent. Differences among Member States regarding the interpretation of obligations, supervisory practices, and cooperation mechanisms limited the effectiveness of the overall European approach.

Directive (EU) 2024/1640 (AMLD6) itself acknowledges that previous experience revealed substantial differences in the practices of competent authorities and inadequate arrangements for cross-border cooperation. In this sense, the AMLA constitutes an institutional response to a structural problem of European integration in the AML/CFT sector.

Reform

The current reform has a clear legislative basis. Directive (EU) 2018/843 (AMLD5) had already highlighted that new forms of risk required an adaptation of the European framework.

The directive emphasized that effective prevention depends on increasing transparency in the Union’s economic and financial environment, particularly with regard to corporate structures and other legal forms that can be used to conceal assets or the true identity of those who control them.

Combating money laundering is not limited to identifying suspicious transactions but also requires reducing the opacity that allows them to flourish.

In the same vein, AMLD5 placed particular emphasis on technological developments. The inclusion of providers of exchange services between virtual and fiat currencies, as well as digital wallet custodians, within the scope of EU legislation was particularly significant.

The European legislator recognized that the relative anonymity of virtual assets could create additional risks and that the competent authorities needed to acquire appropriate tools for monitoring and analyzing such transactions. As early as 2018, it had become clear that financial supervision cannot be limited to traditional banking tools.

Supervision

Directive (EU) 2024/1640 is part of a broader reform package that constitutes the Union’s new AML/CFT legal and institutional framework and explicitly supports the establishment of the AMLA. The key element is the shift from a system of primarily national implementation of the directives toward a model of stronger harmonization, institutional coordination, and a common supervisory framework.

Of particular importance is the fact that the new package is not based exclusively on Directives requiring national transposition, but also includes the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR), which is applied directly and in a harmonized manner across all Member States. This choice aims to reduce the discrepancies that characterized the previous regime and significantly strengthens the degree of harmonization of rules at the European level.

The new Authority is not expected merely to monitor the implementation of the rules. It is tasked with serving as a European hub for consistent supervision, cross-border cooperation, and the development of common methodologies.

Money laundering and terrorist financing are, by their very nature, cross-border phenomena. They exploit discrepancies between legal systems, varying levels of supervisory intensity, and weaknesses in information sharing.

When economic activity is integrated but prevention remains fragmented, the system becomes vulnerable precisely at its weakest points. The AMLA seeks to reduce these asymmetries and strengthen the functional unity of the European area.

Transparency

Of particular importance is the emphasis the new framework places on beneficial ownership registers. Directive 2024/1640 considers these registers crucial for preventing the misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements. Beneficial ownership information must be collected and maintained in central registries in a usable and machine-readable format.

Even more importantly, Member States must ensure the adequacy, accuracy, and timeliness of this data, as well as the existence of procedures for verifying and correcting inconsistencies.

The importance of beneficial ownership registers has also been highlighted by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has emphasized the need to strike a balance between the pursuit of transparency and the protection of personal data and fundamental rights. The discussion, therefore, concerns not only the availability of information but also the conditions for accessing and using it.

This approach reflects a fundamental shift in EU AML/CFT policy. The focus is no longer exclusively on the transaction itself, but also on the legal and economic structure through which it is carried out. The critical question is not only how much money was moved, but also who is behind the legal entity that appears on the surface of the transaction.

Access

The new framework does not stop at the creation of registries but also addresses the issue of access. Financial Intelligence Units, supervisory and judicial authorities, as well as relevant EU bodies, must have immediate and effective access to information regarding (beneficial) ownership. Such access is critical for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of relevant offenses.

The AMLA itself is expected to have access to this information in the exercise of its supervisory mandate, a fact that reinforces its role as a central institution within the new European framework.

The Challenge

Despite the clear direction of the reform, its success cannot be taken for granted. The key question is whether the new architecture will succeed in combining harmonization with proportionality and effectiveness.

A framework that is too rigid or too formal may reinforce mere bureaucratic compliance without substantially improving the ability to identify and prevent the relevant risks.

Conversely, a system that invests in transparency, information interoperability, data quality, and cooperation among competent authorities—as well as among the relevant compliance functions of supervised entities—can substantially enhance Europe’s preventive capacity.

The real challenge for the AMLA is not to issue new guidelines or create additional compliance procedures. It is to prove that Europe can function as a single supervisory area in the face of criminal networks that already operate without borders.

If it succeeds, it will substantially strengthen the credibility of the European financial market. If it fails, the AMLA risks joining the list of institutions with high expectations but limited practical impact.

 

* Spyros Papathanassiou is an associate professor of finance in the Department of Economics at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

** Maria Kaine is a Ph.D. candidate at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Head of Regulatory Compliance, Alpha Bank

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