The simultaneous political dominance of the nationalist and populist current in the United States, France, Germany and Britain is something more than a shift to the right. Most likely, it signals the end of the postwar West as we knew it. That is, an alliance of states which, despite their differences, was based on economic cooperation, multilateral institutions, NATO and European integration.
The re-election of Donald Trump has already shifted the center of gravity of American politics toward protectionism and a transactional view of alliances. The rise of the National Rally in France, the strengthening of the AfD in Germany and the influence of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK in Britain complete a broader political shift. Even without independent governing power, these forces are already influencing the agenda on migration, security, Russia, the green transition and national sovereignty.
The most important consequence would not necessarily be the dissolution of the European Union, but its transformation into a Europe of “national vetoes”. Governments would remain in the Union, but would seek to reclaim powers and make more systematic use of the right of veto.
Decisions on the European budget, sanctions against Russia, defense policy, EU enlargement and migration would become more difficult. Without Franco-German understanding, the possibilities for common borrowing, banking union and strengthening the Community budget would also be limited.
It would, however, be a serious mistake to attribute the rise of these parties exclusively to nationalism, migration or populism. In Germany and France, a significant part of citizens believes that the systemic parties bear responsibility for the current situation. Workers, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, farmers and production executives see the cost of energy and living rising, industry losing competitiveness and governments unable to protect Europe’s productive base.
The systemic parties bear responsibility for the downgrading of Europe’s international and especially geo-economic role.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine was the catalyst for the energy upheaval, and Russia cannot be absolved of its own responsibility. European governments, however, are not innocent in what followed. For many years they failed to shape a serious energy and industrial strategy. Germany in particular based a significant part of its production model on cheap Russian natural gas, while at the same time limiting other stable energy sources. Europe assumed that globalization would continuously ensure cheap energy, open markets and geopolitical stability.
Long before the break with Moscow, the European Union should have diversified supply sources, invested in networks, interconnections and storage, and organized the green transition with a reliable energy reserve. It should also have created protection mechanisms for energy-intensive industries. When the crisis came, it largely replaced relatively cheap Russian natural gas with more expensive solutions, while the United States and China were supporting their own industry more systematically.
The result was an increase in production costs, the suspension of investments and the transfer of activities outside Europe. In Germany in particular, the chemical industry, metallurgy, fertilizers, glass and parts of the automotive industry were affected.
For many citizens, therefore, the restoration of a functional dialogue with Russia does not constitute ideological identification with the Kremlin, but an economic necessity. The vote for the AfD or the National Rally often functions as pressure for a change in energy policy and protection of domestic production.
The traditional parties are making a mistake when they collectively characterize these voters as extremists or anti-Europeans. If they do not recognize the real economic losses and social insecurity, they will continue to strengthen the forces they are trying to contain.
This does not mean a return to the old relations with Russia as if the war had not intervened. It means that Europe needs its own strategy: security and deterrence, but at the same time a diplomatic perspective, control over the cost of its choices and protection of its productive autonomy.
The loss of industrial competitiveness is not just another sectoral problem. It threatens the very existence of Europe as an autonomous political and economic pole. Without a strong industry there can be no technological progress, adequate defense, quality employment or a sustainable welfare state.
At the same time, American protectionism and possible European countermeasures can trigger new trade conflicts. Markets would react to political uncertainty by increasing borrowing costs, especially for countries with high public debt.
For Greece, such a shift would be more dangerous than it appears. It is an open economy, has high public debt and depends significantly on European stability. The weakening of common policies could increase the yields on Greek bonds, limit investments and affect exports, shipping and tourism.
In a Europe of national priorities, the wealthier countries could also seek a smaller Community budget, limiting cohesion resources and the Common Agricultural Policy.
Equally critical is the issue of security. In a transactional international order, Greece will not be able to take for granted either European solidarity or automatic American support against Turkey. It will need to allocate more national resources to defense, while on migration the stricter controls of northern countries may trap more people in the states of first entry.
Athens therefore needs strong European alliances, but not only that, diversification of energy relations, strengthening of defense, reduction of debt and a clear policy for domestic production.
The great challenge is not simply the rise of four anti-system political figures or parties. It is the crisis of a European system which, while rightly defending democratic values and international legality, failed to protect the competitiveness, energy security and standard of living of its citizens. In other words, it failed to protect Europe.
The systemic strategies unfortunately ended up driving citizens’ votes to anti-system parties for the survival of the European System!
Difficult and dangerous paths.
* Michalis Sallas is chairman of Lyktos Group, honorary chairman of Piraeus Bank, former university professor. The article was first published in To Vima tis Kyriakis.