The West is not facing just two wars today. A third is raging within its own ranks: a distinctive kind of “civil war” that cuts across governments, political camps and societies, undermining an effective response to the crises.
The apparent paradox is that those who support continuing the war in Ukraine often want the one in Iran to end. And those who believe military pressure on Tehran is necessary are pressing for a compromise with Moscow!
But beyond ideological differences, this paradox also reflects the West’s difficulty in supporting both wars at once. It lacks the necessary ammunition, as well as the economic resilience to withstand their impact.
US opinion polls capture one side of this contradiction. 65% of Republicans approve of the initial attack on Iran, compared with just 10% of Democrats. Conversely, 69% of Democrats support military aid to Ukraine, but just 28% of Republicans do.
More importantly, in both cases, those who oppose continuing the hostilities have strong arguments. Military objectives look increasingly difficult, perhaps even unattainable, while the costs are mounting.
Two wars at a stalemate
At stake in Iran are US primacy in the Middle East, the broader position of the US as the dominant superpower, its strategic relationship with Israel and the influence in Washington of the pro-Israel lobby, which backs a hard line.
But despite the enormous destruction, Tehran’s regime remains standing. The attempt to subdue a country of 90 million people with substantial resources and capabilities risks turning into a protracted war of attrition, with unpredictable consequences for the entire region.
The cost has already affected the US political scene. After the defeat in the midterm elections, Trump acknowledged that the war and high fuel prices had cost Republicans. As a result, Vance is pressing for a deal, while Netanyahu is calling for fresh strikes.
In Ukraine, what is at stake, beyond the country’s territorial integrity, is the future role of NATO in Europe’s security architecture. That is why the prospect of capitulation has met with fierce opposition.
But the prospect of a Ukrainian military victory has all but vanished. Russia is struggling to advance, but retains the ability to launch devastating strikes against critical infrastructure, particularly energy infrastructure. Recent attacks on power systems supplied by nuclear plants portend a nightmarish winter, which could have unpredictable consequences.
Adding to war fatigue are fresh corruption scandals. The High Anti-Corruption Court recently ordered an investigation into allegations of vote-buying involving David Arakhamia, a close associate of Zelensky.
Senior officials in the SBU intelligence service and other agencies are also accused of protecting a criminal network.
Also adding to the picture are unprecedented clashes between civilians and security forces near Kyiv on 2 November, following allegations that mobilised men had been mistreated.
The picture emerging is far from encouraging for Ukraine. In Europe, however, powerful political forces treat any discussion of compromise with scorn, while the Baltic states in particular fear that a deal would leave Russia stronger and themselves exposed.
Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal has formally opposed any European dialogue with Putin, while EU High Representative Kaja Kallas has rejected the need for a new security architecture.
But when asked what would happen if Ukraine collapsed under the strain of the destructive conditions it faces, none of those opposed to negotiations has a convincing answer.
The “civil war” within societies
The divide also runs through societies themselves, often pitting the political elite against a large part of its electoral base.
In Italy, for example, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto acknowledged that most public opinion opposes military aid to Ukraine, but said the government cannot give ground when it believes public opinion is wrong. Meanwhile, coalition partner Matteo Salvini is calling for aid to Kyiv to stop.
In Germany, 42% consider arms deliveries to Ukraine excessive, a figure that rises to 54% in the east of the country. These are the highest figures since the war began. Such divisions are precisely what fuel anti-establishment forces, alongside the economic consequences, which are hitting households and businesses through rising prices.
In short, the West’s “civil war” carries a real cost.
It makes it harder to forge a common strategy, delays critical decisions and politically weakens governments, adding political instability to the already heavy economic toll of the energy crisis, arms spending and the strains of war.
Worse still, the more inflammatory statements and hybrid operations in Europe multiply, the greater the risk of uncontrolled escalation with Russia, which remains one of the world’s two largest nuclear powers.
The result could be a West doubly defeated — economically, militarily and geopolitically — by wars that are exhausting it, while its main strategic rival, China, expands its scope for power and influence.
Great powers do not lose their primacy only when they are defeated on the battlefield. They also lose it when they wear themselves out in wars they cannot win, leaving the biggest winner to be the one that did not have to fight.