When one country directly challenges another’s rights, there are two fundamental ways to respond. The first is confrontation, including the use of military force, with all the attendant risks.
The second is negotiation, with the aim of reaching an agreement that resolves the differences, in whole or in part.
But there is also a third way: using diplomacy, alliances and economic interests to achieve specific goals, even when opposing positions remain unchanged.
The Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), the electricity link between Greece and Cyprus, shows how this approach can work, but also what it may cost.
The precedent set by Kasos
In the summer of 2024, Turkey sent warships to the area around Kasos, where surveys for the GSI cable were under way. It thus showed that it was prepared to risk even a military confrontation to back its claims.
Caught off guard, the government avoided escalation. The crisis subsided, but Ankara had succeeded in turning its challenge to Greek rights into a reality on the ground, creating a serious precedent.
Through the actions of both sides, the sea area in question had become de facto disputed at an operational level. Ankara gained the ability to impose the costs of its challenge in practice, even without any change to the legal status.
Turkey’s lack of consent at the time was, after all, enough to delay the resumption of surveys by more than two years. In the meantime, however, another tactic emerged.
In the case of the vessel Kobi Ruegg, which was surveying the EMC telecommunications cable, Ankara initially cited the ‘approval’ and then the ‘consent’ of the Turkish authorities in NAVTEX notices. Athens objected, but the surveys went ahead.
The pattern is now familiar. Turkey is seeking to make its consent part of the process, even in areas where Greece rejects Turkish jurisdiction.
The French workaround
Faced with this, the government opted to circumvent the problem through France. France’s Meridiam acquired a 66% stake in GSI, leaving the remaining 34% with IPTO.
The cable’s manufacturer, Nexans, is also French, as is the survey vessel Abeille Marengo.
The task of notifying Ankara, which would have been unthinkable for a Greek company or the Greek state, was therefore handed to a third party — Paris — and was ultimately carried out through a diplomatic note verbale from the French state.
France has political clout and strong business interests in Turkey, including in the defence industry, while it is perhaps Greece’s strongest supporter in the EU today. Meridiam itself has invested in major infrastructure projects in Turkey and is reportedly interested in further investment.
Moreover, the European Union’s lukewarm response to Turkey’s obstruction of GSI, combined with Turkey’s growing geopolitical importance to Europe, made it doubtful from the outset that Paris would avoid notifying Ankara.
As Evangelos Venizelos rightly pointed out in a recent interview, French-Turkish relations are not shaped solely by the cable or by Greek interests. Allies can help break an impasse, but they also have their own priorities.
For now, however, this approach appears to be working, despite premature leaks — down to the last detail, no less — and a degree of amateurism in the overall handling of the affair.
The French vessel began its surveys, and Turkey’s first response was limited to a radio message, in which Ankara reiterated its claims and invoked the ‘consent’ of the Turkish authorities, but did not prevent the work from continuing.
The cost that may become clear in the future
There is, of course, another side to the story. Turkey is increasingly seeking to present itself as having a say in activities in areas where Greece considers it has exclusive authority.
Each time it succeeds, it creates a precedent, the first and most serious being Kasos. This problem will not simply disappear. It is also the basis for the fierce criticism from Antonis Samaras, as well as the accusations levelled by almost the entire opposition over the risk of new faits accomplis.
Yet prolonging the impasse would have left a project of strategic importance, with a budget of €1.9 billion and €657 million in EU funding, at a standstill. The alternative of using military force would have opened the way to a dangerous test of resolve, with an uncertain outcome, at an exceptionally sensitive international moment.
Here lie both the value and the cost of the third way.
Greece can achieve a substantive result without removing Turkey’s ability to challenge its rights. Turkey, in turn, will retain its claims, and may even strengthen them, while nevertheless accepting in practice the progress of a project it tried to block.
Over the longer term, success for Greece will depend on completing construction of the cable, but also on the possible consequences of the diplomatic documents and statements exchanged as part of this undertaking.
The context of today’s reality
In any case, Greece cannot ignore the transactional nature of international affairs, in which power, economic interests and alliances of convenience are carrying ever greater weight.
This is especially true when it is doubtful that these conditions will change significantly once President Trump’s term ends, since the causes run deeper than the choices or style of any one president. International law rightly remains the foundation of Greece’s positions. Its application, however, depends to a large extent on the stance of the powerful.
For Greece, adapting requires realism and flexibility, as well as the systematic use of investment, energy and infrastructure as tools of foreign policy, with an awareness of the limits of every alliance.
The third way, as illustrated by GSI, is nevertheless only a temporary solution, with political and diplomatic limits that became apparent almost immediately.
If Greece wants to avoid confrontation, as has become clear so far, then the only alternative for resolving the differences is to use diplomatic pressure to bring Turkey to meaningful negotiations or to recourse to international justice.
But it must be recognised that such a process will involve compromises, so it is unrealistic to assume in advance that the Greek positions will be fully vindicated.